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STUDENT NOTES
The liberal courts, following the minority rule, advance these
reasons for permitting the action:
(1) The Married Women's Statutes have completely changed
the common law rule.
(2) There is a changing conception of the marital relation and
therefore the result is justifiable.
The writer believes that insurance has played an important part
in bringing about this minority rule. Today almost every motorist
carries liability insurance. The husband, in driving the car, is
negligent. The wife is injured. In order to reach his insurance she
must sue him. The courts, the writer believes, have gone far to
recognize this minority rule, thereby to permit the wife to recover
this insurance fund. This, as a reason, cannot be openly stated as
evidence of insurance in such cases is inadmissible because pre-
judicial.
On the ground of recovering the insurance the minority rule
may well be sustained. But to permit such a rule in this type of
case necessarily calls for its extension into the field of intentional
wrongs. As such, it is entirely too broad. The common law justifi-
cations for the rule still apply. The interpretation of the statutes
under the majority rule may not seem logical-but law is not al-
ways a matter of logic. The desirable social results should be the
deciding factor in construing statutes. It may seem unfair to allow
the wife an opportunity to reach this insurance fund-but greater
harm would result from a rule of law which disturbs domestic
tranquility and leads to social evils.
-JEROME KATZ.
ToRTS-WiLD ANIMALS-NEGLIGENCE AS BASIS OF LIABILTY FOR
PERSONAL INJURIES.-The question of liability for injury done by
vicious animals, wild or domesticated, has not often reached the
Supreme Court of Appeals of this State. The recent adjudication
of Vaughan v. Miller Brothers "101" Ranch Wild WVest Show is
therefore interesting, throwing light as it does on a hitherto un-
adjudicated point. In an appeal to an order quashing an affidavit
for attachment against defendant, which affidavit merely set forth
the injury, ownership of the ape which bit off the plaintiff's finger
and the fact that the animal was on exhibition, the court said in
'153 S. E. 289 (1930).
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the syllabus: "In an action against an exhibitor of a wild animal
for injury caused thereby, facts constituting negligence in its re-
straint must be alleged." An affidavit of attachment must con-
tain the substance of the cause of action although such particular-
ity in the manner of stating it is not required as in a declaration.'
There is thus no reason why this decision should not have the
same effect as the sustaining of a demurrer to a declaration in an
action at law.
This point of the law has been commonly treated as a part of the
"at peril" or "liability without fault" phase of the law of torts.
Under English law absolute liability has been imposed for several
classes of acts. Excepting certain natural uses and an act of God or
"vis major" what ever is brought on the land is brought there at
the owner's peril.' The owner is an insurer for the damage done
by his straying cattle? And the owner or keeper is absolutely liable
for the injury done by -wild animals or by those with known vicious
propensities.! The first proposition has met with general recogni-
tion in this country and has seemingly been adopted by West Vir-
ginia although the language used will certainly not permit an un-
qualified statement to that effect.7 The "at peril" doctrine in
regard to straying cattle has seldom, with perhaps the exception
of the New England States, received sanction in this country and
is repudiated in this state except where adopted by local vote ac-
cording to statute.' This was true chiefly because the open nature
of the country, particularly in the early days of settlement, made
that law an absurdity which for England was a necessity.
The third class in which absolute liability has been imposed,
injuries by vicious animals, is commonly divided into two groups.
2Deming National Bank v. Baker, 83 W. Va. 429, 98 S. E. 438 (1918).
3CLERK AND LINDSILL I N TORTS (7th ed. 1921) 114; POLLOCK ON TORTs
(13th ed. 1929) 516.
'Patent Candle Co. v. London County Council, 2 Ch. 526 (1908) (fifth
from privy); Fletcher v. Rylands, 1 Ex. 265, L. P. 3 H. L. 330 (1886) stored
water); Tennant v. Goldwin, 1 Salk 21 and 360 (1704); for recent cases and
applications of the doctrine in England see CLERK AN LiNDSELL ON ToaTs
(7th ed. 1921) 424-5; POLLOcK ON TORTs (13th ed. 1929) c. XII, 500.Lee v. Riley 1 C. B. N. S. 722 (1865).
*May v. Burdette, Q. B. 101, 115 Eng. Rep. 1213 (1846).
"See Mercantile Co. v. Thurmond, 68 W. Va. 530, 70 S. E. 126 (1911);
Wigal v. City of Parkersburg, 74 W. Va. 25, 81 S. B. 554 (1914). Language
in each opinion will support both doctrines, i. e., absolute liability and liabil-
ity based on negligence applying rule of res ipLs loquitur.
"Blaine v. C. & 0. Ry. Co., 9 W. Va. 253 (1876) ; Baylor v. B. & 0. Ry.
Co., 9 W. Va- 270 (1876). See reference in W. VA. CODE ANN. (Barnes, 1923)
c. 60,§§ 3a,3b.
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(1) undomesticated wild animals (ferae vaturae), (2) domestica-
Ied animals whose viciousness cannot be presumed. The liability has
in each case (scienter having been found in the latter) been held
to be the same.' Indeed, one is but the corollary of the other the
difference consisting solely in the mode of showing the scienter."
In the case of animals ferae naturae the scienter is presumed from
the type of animal. In the other'it must be proved.
The doctrine is very ancient. Hale in Pleas of the Crown sets
it forth thus: "Though'he have no particular notice, that he did
any such thing before, yet if it be a beast, that is ferae naturae, as
a lion, a bear, a wolf, yea an ape or monkey, if he gets loose and
do harm to any person, the owner is liable to an action for the dam-
age."" It is even referred to in the Mosaic Law." In May v. Bur-
dett?" the modern rule had its inception. That case was for in-
juries resulting from the bite of a monkey and the declaration
averred scienter but no negligence and was upheld, the court say-
ing that if the animal was of the proper class not even the scienter
was necessary. In Filburn v. People's Palace Car Company" the
plaintiff was injured by an elephant on exhibition and no scienter
was alleged. The sole question was whether the beast was of a class
sufficiently wild to impute knowledge and it was decided that it
was. The American states passing upon the question have, with
the exception of New Jersey, given sanction to the doctrine." The
0 POLLOCx ON ToaTs (13th ed., 1929) 516; CLEaI AND LxNDSELL ON TORTS
(7th ed., 1921) 441-2; May v. Burdette, 9 Q. B. 101 (1846).
0See Alderson B., in Jackson v. Smithson, 15 M. & W. 565, 15 L. J. Ex. 311
(1896): "I can see no distinction between the case of an animal which
breaks thru the tameness of its nature and one that is ferae naturao."
"I Hale, P. C. 430. For other ancient authorities Com. Dig. Action on
Case of Negligence (A5); Thomas v. Morgan, 2 C. M. & B. 496; Rex v.
Huggins, 2 Ld. Raym, 1574; arguments of counsel in May v. Burdette, 9 Q. B.
101, 115 Eng. Rep. 2113 (1846).
"Exodus, e XXI 28,29,36.
13 9 Q. B. 101,115 Eng. Rep. 1213 (1846).
1425 Q. B. D. 258 (1890). See also Jackson v. Smithson, 15 M. & W. 563
(1846) (averment of negligence superfluous).
Congress, etc., Springs Co. v. Edgar, 99 U. S. 645, 25 L. ed. 487 (1879);
see collection cases 3 C. J. 87, note 16. See collection of cases on liability
of exhibitors in 22 A. L. R. at page 629. In Copley v. Wills, 153 S. W. 830
(Texas, 1913) the court says: "(the feeding of a monkey by a boy)
was a natural thing to do and but emphasizes the reason and necessity of the
rule that requires such animals to be so kbpt as to absolutely prevent such
•ocoun-ences.11
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dissent of New Jersey is quite consistent since liability without
fault is allowed in no case whatever) °
Naturally such a rule could not remain long without some de-
fense becoming recognized. Since negligence in the ordinary sense
was not the gist of the action contributory negligence could be no
defense. But if the plaintiff wilfully invites the attack, or im-
prudently places himself in a position to be attacked the owner or
keeper is not liable1 Most of the apparent contradictions found
by the court in Vaughan v. Wild West Show, supra, are varying
examples of this rule of defense. In Marlor v. Balh5 the plaintiff
quite imprudenily stroked a zebra. To allow persons injured by
their own folly a recovery would be absurd. Nevertheless this rule
can, of course, be carried to such an extreme as to rob the rule of
absolute liability of any efficacy just as the rule of evidence called
res ipsa loquitur can practically impose absolute liability where
negligence is the ground. This fact does not affect the reason of
the rule of liability. In Jonson v. Mack Manufacturing Company'
the West Virginia court adopted the rule of absolute liability as re-
gards domesticated vicious animals. The injury was caused by a
boar but no recovery was allowed as there was not sufficient
evidence to establish the scienter. Since, as pointed out before, this
rule is but the corollary of the wild animal rule it would seem that
the case is no longer law since the decision in Vaughan v. Wild
West Siww, supra. It is not logically possible to have absolute
liability in the one case and not the other.
"Marshall v. Welwood, 38 N. J. Law 339 (1876) was a case involving the
explosion of a steam boiler in which the court repudiated the entire doctrine
of Fletcher v. Rylands, 1 Ex. 265 (1866). De Gray v. Murray, 69 N. J. Law
458, 55 Atl. 237 (1903) following the principle in the preceding case held
that injuries by a vicious dog kept for home protection created only a
liability for negligence in its restraint.
17 Marlor v. Ball, 16 T. L. R. 239 (1900); Besozzi v. Harris, 1 F. & E.
92; Wyatt v. Rosherville Gardens Co., 2 T. L. R. 282; Mallory v. Starn, 191
N. Y. 21.83 N. E. 588 (1908.)
16 T. L. R. 239 (1900). Other decisions cited in Vaughn v. Wild West
Show, supra, are: Hayes v. Smith, 62 Ohio St. 161, 56 N. E. 879 (1900)
(negligence in restraining a vicious dog was held the gist of the action, the
failure to restrain being prima facie evidence of same); Bischoff v. Cheney,
89 Conn. 1, 92 Atl. 660 (1914) (the plaintiff was bitten by a cat and the
court said negligence in its keeping must be shown). Both the preceding
cases are contra to the general rule but the syllabus of Fake v. Addicks, 4.5
Minn. 37, 47 N. W. 450, 22 Am. St. Rep. 716 (1890) cited as contra, reads:
"In an action to recover damages for an injury caused by a vicious animal,
the gravamen is the neglect to restrain after notice of its vicious propensity."
An examination of the opinion discloses that the word "neglect" is used
in the sense of " I fail." Y
" 65 W. Va. 544, 64 S. E. 841,131 Am. St. Rep. 979 (1908).
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As a question of original justice the "at peril" doctrine may
be open to doubt but it seems to be spreading, particularly in
reference to the use of land.' Reading between the lines in
Vaugha v. Wild West Show, supra, and considering the care
with which exhibitors do usually surround their wild animal dis-
plays it seems likely that the rule of defense stated above might
be applicable and hence it was an injustice to defendants to have
their property tied up by an attachment proceeding. One might
well doubt the wisdom of overthrowing a generally-recognized rule
of law to avert a single case of injustice.
-ROBERT E. STEALEY.
See references in note 4, supra.
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